2/3/2006 9:12 AM
Discussion with Paul Werbos and others
Certainly the point was NOT that
the discipline of physics (which does have various schools of thought within
it) is the same as religious fundamentalisms, but that there are shared natures
to any coherent way of thinking.
Conceptual coherence, as Paul W
has been in a position to know first hand in his extensive interactions with
other scientists, may come from the physics of energy coherence as
"used" by the brain system. Certainly this notion of a physical
basis for coherent belief systems is consistent with Karl Pribram's work -
which both Paul W and I know in some detail.
A fact that Penrose points out
about physics in "Road To Reality" is that there can be excellent
coherent theories about the nature of physics, each being wonderfully
explanatory; but not consistent with each other.
So the recognition of a boundary
to the explanatory capacity of the ultra coherent body of knowledge called
mathematics, seems justified on several fronts. The arguments made by
Robert Rosen goes to this recognition, and does so in a way that is in the best
traditions of formal thought and natural science.
Rosen and Penrose are not
the only ones who have stepped outside of the notion that a single theory of
everything is possible. The historically observable search for a single
theory of everything appears to have certain unjustified assumptions that are
considered to be essential to any allowable theory. "Time" for
example may not in reality be anything like the fairly simple notion that is
considered to be essential to any allowable theory. Of course, Paul W's
deep work presses on the simple concept of time (forward flowing without
structure), in ways that he might talk about.
If we could return to the
discussion started by Judith Rosen on relationalism, the "complex"
entailments of relationship as expressed; it would be very nice.
The position that I am holding is
that everyday human decision making is modeled more perfectly with "web
service" technology and standards if the model of information is formative
in the moment, and so reflects the coherence of the situation rather than being
forced to align with a set of "universal standards". The
complex entailment of relationships might need to be measured in the moment,
and this measurement will depend on structural knowledge and would be possible
if common standards were available to express the components of data and
process categories. The position is stated in the Road map I developed
for US Customs and elsewhere.... and leads to a stratification of the standards
for data and process categories, as well as mechanisms that recognize novelty
and procedures for human involvement in cases where the aggregation of
categories does not lead to the intentions of the web service requestor.
This is human centric (with
formalism) as opposed to formalism centric.
Organizations like W3C and OMG
tend to want to impose a special and often authoritarian universal information
model rather than a process for deriving a situational model of information
(for example by using a stratified theory of ontology and using several
separated theories). Sorry this cannot be both clearer and simpler.
The point that cannot be
expressed in government working groups (like ONTAC) is that there is a specific
business oriented bias that keeps W3C and related standards bodies in
business. This proposition is not allowed. It is as if there are
Emperors who have a specific illusion that cannot be discussed. The
justification for not allowing a specific alternative viewpoint is
linked to something that acts like an religious fundamentalism. This
behavior is not consistent with most American's understanding of the
government's nature or function.
This specific alternative
viewpoint suggests that formalism, whether first order logics or Hilbert type
mathematics, cannot live in the present moment. Formalism is built from
abstraction, and abstraction occurs in the past. In fact, the
formation of natural categories, whether or not inducted into conceptual
structure by humans or not, occurs in the present as a complex consequence of a
complex past. The complex phenomenon of categorical
formation cannot be 'perfectly" modeled by Hilbert mathematics
precisely due to the self entailment properties that Rosen very clearly
defined. This does not mean that Hilbert mathematics type models are not
useful in talking about category formation. It means, as Penrose
specifically suggests, that there are other principles in additional to those
we now understand that are necessary to understanding category formation
(whether in the human mind or independent of the human mind).
The assumption that a specific
set of abstract categories is in fact "completely and entirely
universal" is where one set of issues arises. In some settings this
assumption does not lead to any mismatch between model and reality. There
is no problem here.
In other settings this assumption
is not only just a little incorrect, but entirely incorrect. The second
setting occurs often, we conjecture, in the expressions of living systems:
genes, cells, persons, social systems.
The status of formalism is
distinct from the status of natural systems. Judith Rosen's emphasis is
that "mathematics" lives as a complex system embedded in the social
fabric, but that the application of mathematics is almost always
disembodied. So that the nature of mathematics, starting with the nature
of induction of the postulates and axioms of mathematics, is not fully realized
in most application settings.
The Rosen like arguments have in
the past not been recognized by the intellectual authorities, it is true.
This non-recognition is a historical fact. The existence of
"intellectual authorities" is a historical fact. These facts
might change, but are held in place by the nexus of historical facts that
govern the society.
The validity of Rosen's core
concepts related to complexity and anticipation are not objectively dismissed
by the leading intellectual authority. These core concepts are dismissed
because they are not coherent with the belief system holding together the most
powerful of the conceptual coherences accepted by the institutions of science,
and the funding mechanisms. They are indirectly set aside.
Funding mechanisms is one way in
which this indirect peer review occurs. A certain type of mentality is
selected so that the funding bias rewards short term utilitarian projects, and
a specific set of "fundamentalisms". Example: certain types of
people with strong personal egos can find their way into position of peer
review and funding decisions. A specific individual with a huge ego was
the specific reason why each of the Peter Kugler proposals (1992 - 1998 (I am
guessing)) to NSF was rejected. Each year, Peter carefully redeveloped
the proposal to specifically address each of the points that peer review had
made. But over time, it became more than apparent that the peer review
was just not an honest one. In spite of this appearance, Peter took the
peer review as constructive and very carefully addressed the issues.
This couples science to short
term measures of value (as determined by individuals within the funding system
who look to advance narrowly defined professional / personal objectives).
It is just structural. Government funding creates a specific bias, where
other bias might have occurred. The bias that ideally might control
funding is long term investigations about the nature of reality... and
yes this bias plays a role on the mix. But is pure science (what ever
that might be) the controlling bias?
The National Project is
predicated on the observed need to change certain attachments between computer
science and business, and in this way change the bias so that science might
find a way forward around, through or over the limitations that Godel,
Penrose, Rosen and others have revealed.
http://www.bcngroup.org/area2/KSF/nationalProject.htm