Chapter 4
Grounding The Tri-level Architecture in
Neuropsychology and Open Logic
Revised February 2003, May 2004
Section
2: The Houk/Barto model of the cerebellum
Section 3: Model of Information Metabolism
Section 4: Advent of Anticipatory Technology
Section 5: Ecological processes
Section
6: Application of stratified theory to
information production
Section 7: Generalizing
a model of human memory and anticipation
Mathematical models
about the principles of theoretical biology were developed in the 1950s and
1960s (see Levine, 1991, for history).
These models involved differential equations, switching nets and
category theory. The formal work by
Rashensky, Rosen and Grossberg helped to establish this foundation to modern
connectionism. The resulting field of
study is quite a large one.
In stratified
theory we have introduced a new set of foundational principles, some in direct
opposition to the principles of connectionism and some that are built on a
solid heritage shared with connectionism.
Many of the foundational principles for connectionism are
controversial. The notion that information
can be distributed is perhaps the primary point at issue. The strong form of the field called
artificial intelligence, or simply “AI”, has long taken great pains to
discredit the notion that information can be anything but explicit. The historical context and motivations for
the long lasting conflict between AI and connectionism has to be addressed
carefully and will not be attempted here.
Stratified theory
takes one additional step, beyond connectionism, that is even more
controversial. In stratified theory
information can be discrete or distributed, but can also be present in many
organizational levels. These levels of
organization can even be nested so that two systems interacting with each other
may have entirely different substructure.
The stratification is thus “relative” to location. Moreover, the stratification itself sets up
a theory of emergence, as we will see in this chapter.
I have been
somewhat involved in primary work on the nature of neural and immune systems,
both while a graduate student, in mathematics, and later in my professional
life. I was involved in and published
detailed work on specific neural circuits.
These studies revealed certain general systems properties including: 1)
associative learning, 2) lateral inhibition, 3) opponent processing, 4) intra
anatomical neuromodulation, and 5) cross-level resonance (Levine, Parks &
Prueitt, 1993; Prueitt, 1994).
In 1995 my work was
to be influenced by
1)
Meeting
several of the leading Russian logicians in the field of control theory and
semiotics
2)
A
growing awareness that mathematics, as we known it today, has NOT been
constructed to model the cross organizational scale phenomenon that clearly is
involved in maintaining autopoiesis (Maturana and Velara, 1989) for a living
system
3)
A
growing awareness that information technology was hopelessly entangled with the
strong form of artificial intelligence and scientific reductionism.
Each of these three
influences has had a profound impact on the development of stratified theory,
and the increasing significance of anticipatory technology.
While late
twentieth century advances have proved significant, it is argued by some that
the attractiveness of, the hope for, a single theory of brain function, perhaps
based on the computer metaphor, was to mislead basic research in cognitive
science. The confusion created by the
science fiction aspects of artificial intelligence was further distorting the
process of investigation. Many shared this
viewpoint, but it was unclear what could be done.
For example, in
1995, Lynn Nadel made a point to frame the current interest, in how learning
and memory is organized, as a counter intellectual current to long held
dominate scientific positions that, incorrectly, hold there is but one general
long-term memory system (Nadel, 1995). In his analysis, analysis shared by
others in (Schacter & Tulving, 1994) the fixation of memory theorists on
the possibility of a single model can be traced to, the absence of, operational
definitions of what is a "system".
Nadel's conclusions
was that multiple memory systems exist; memory is involved in all or most of
neural processes; and that experimental methods have identified the functional
and architectural characteristics of distinct types of learning and memory.
General systems
properties have also motivated the field of artificial neural networks and the
related fields of computational control theory. The theory of embedding fields,
Stephen Grossberg's original formulation of a methodology for modeling neuronal
networks, envisioned the development of a body of computational algorithms that
described the neuropsychology, the neurochemistry, as well as other
experimental evidence regarding the mechanisms involved in human perceptual and
emotive actions (Grossberg, 1972a, 1972b).
Theories of field
dynamics and ecological psychology have been used to extend and overcome some
of the limitations of early connectionist methods. Central to these limitations are the various forms of a
"vector representation hypothesis" that assume vector space mathematics
to be sufficient for modeling biological activities. Ecological psychology in particular offers some new language
that helps to separate the concept of a system and the concept of a system’s
environment. Once one has this
language, then one can more easily talk about multiple ontologies and the
grounding of a specific ontology within a context, e.g, as having a “pragmatic
axis”.
However, no general
theory of micro to macro transformations of information has yet developed that
fully captures the essential notions of emergent computation and cross
organizational scale entanglement.
In 2003, bits and
pieces of a general theory did exist, though scattered in different
disciplines. The notion of a national project began to be discussed. This project would recognize that the
limiting constraint on developing what is now called the Anticipatory Web was
the educational background common to those who might develop such a new reality
and use its capabilities. We concluded
that a general theory could not be developed without some sort of counter
balance to popular theories that we felt are at least partially based in a
specific type of confusion.
As discussed in
previous chapters, notions of cross scale entanglement exist in the historical
literature of quantum mechanics. But the notion of cross scale entanglement
existed almost nowhere else. In
linguistics, one could talk about double articulating and thus introduce a
parallel between quantum mechanical entanglements and the issue of
ambiguation/disambiguation in linguistics (Lyons, 1968). In the various schools of ecological
psychology, behavioral cycles are described as having a supporting substructure
and having an open environment in which cyclic behavior is expressed.
Furthermore, behavioral cycles are seen to have distinct modes and to be
emergent from an interaction between environment, self and substructure.
Action/perception cycles are seen in ecological physics and psychology.
Partition/organize cycles are seen in models of molecular computation (Kugler
et al, 1990). But these fields of study
where not integrated and no process for integration had been contemplated,
before the planning began for a national project.
Prueitt’s two
conferences at Georgetown University (1991-1992) and Pribram’s series of
conferences (1992-1996) at Radford University set the stage for planning the
national project on knowledge sciences.
The precise notion of cross scale entanglement arises from the logic of
quantum mechanics and has given rise to various "quantum metaphors"
linking consciousness and awareness (Pribram, 1991; 1993; 1994; King &
Pribram, 1995; Pribram & King, 1996). The cross scale entanglement issues,
as well as empirical evidence on the formation of compartments and the
stratification of matter and energy in time, lead us to restate many
fundamental questions about the relationships between psychological objects of
investigation and physiological objects of investigation. The national project was conceived based on
the difficulty one finds in talking about these questions, even within
scholarly communities.
As important a
principle as cross scale entanglement is, we begin to realize that the biology
of physiological phenomenon requires a full theory of stratification. This realization lead us to define a
tri-level architecture for the machine side of an Anticipatory Web (of
information). Those computational
constructions that encode the categories of invariance over a set of measured
data were to be encoded at one level of organization. Anticipatory templates evolved under a different set of
processes. In real time, the two
“levels” entangle in respond to specific input from the “present moment”. This evocative input draws into an Orb
construction some, and not all, of the elements from the measured data
invariance. The human side of the
Anticipatory Web creates an interpretation of the informational structures.
Our work in 2002
and 2003 developed a standard format and encoding structure both for the set of
all categories of data invariances and for a relational operator that defined a
local relational property between pairs of these categories. The result was the first Ontology
referential bases (Orbs) developed by Nathan Einwechter and myself. The 2003 notational paper for Orbs is
provided in Appendix B.
We began to see
that a new paradigm described technology architecture for text
understanding. From this new paradigm one
should be able to create a general class of computation aids to human reasoning
and information gathering. By
anticipating the economic power of new a class of technologies we hoped to
provide some mechanism for the exploitation of this technology. Here at last, we argued was a value
proposition that would allow stratified theory to take center stage.
A specific
application of this work to defense intelligence was developed and
proposed. Several possible applications
to bio-defense were addressed in new work that built on the foundations laid
out before 2002. However, we still
could not find funding. The
development of the first full Orb-based human-center information production
system could not be undertaken. In 2003
and 2004 our efforts constantly were limited by what program managers, and
advocates for things like the Semantic Web, could bring themselves to
understand.
We knew that it was
just a matter of time, and timing. It
was a matter of time before the natural principles of the Anticipatory Web were
more commonly understood and appreciated.
For our group, it was also a question of timing. Could we catch the wave and bring the BCNGroup Foundation into an active role? The Charter of the Behavioral Computational
Neuroscience Group envisioned the aggregation of new intellectual property in
the knowledge sciences as a means to simplify the literature and fund a the
development of a K-12 curriculum.
The proposed
architecture of text understanding had been grounded in neuropsychology, and in
the formalisms of open systems theory (Prueitt, 1996). The architecture made a
fundamental distinction between a computational and natural system (Prueitt,
1995; 1997). Understanding this distinction helped us to draw the line between
what computational systems may be expected to do and what role natural systems
must play in human computer interactions. This distinction leads to what we
called perceptual measurement. Our discussions
about perceptual measurement lead us to develop the nine-step actionable
intelligence process model in 2003, along with differential and formative
ontology. Web reference to this work
was made available.
The grounding of
the Tri-level architecture in neuropsychology has been an important part both
of our formulation of the principles of anticipatory technology. With this grounding completed we began
convincing policy leaders that the national project was absolutely essential if
the United States was to take the next step towards a more full realization of
participatory democracy.
During the 1980's,
the neurophysiology and neurochemistry of the cerebellum and motor expression
circuits gave rise to a model of the cerebellum as an array of adjustable
pattern generators (Houk, 1987; 1989; Houk & Barto, 1991). A great deal of detail about the physical
processes involved was known already in the late 1980s and computational models
enriched this science during the 1990s.
Other examples exist in research literatures that focus on computational
models of the hippocampus, the prefrontal cortex, the visual cortex, etc.
The Houk/Barto
model of neuronal connectivity was used as one example, among others, to
illustrate foundational principles in the context of modeling a physical
single-level processes conjectured to be involved in composing, controlling and
expressing motor programs.
Holonomic brain
theory (Pribram 1971; 1991) describes a different type of model. The difference is, simply stated, huge. Pribram stressed the difference between
localized processes and process that were simply not localized or even
localizable.
Gravity is an
example of a holonomic constraint. It
is involved in local dynamics, and yet its nature is only slightly affected by
the local boundary conditions of things that must move around in a field
expression of this constraint. The
anticipatory technologies allows the abstract representation of a holonomic
constraint to be separated from the things that have initial conditions, due to
emergence, and boundary conditions related to location. The physical correspondent to the
abstraction of the middle layer is a set of physical objects that exists only
in a present moment.
How does the brain
“see” these objects? Due to the
processing of light from the object, a distributed wave propagation of micro
signals from the neuron’s receptive field move along dendrite pathways towards
the cell soma.
Each
micro-dendritic event, emanating from groups of synapses produces a localized
Fourier transform (using Pribram’s language), converts wave potential into
discrete event potential in the form of pulses. These pulses use channel properties of dendrites to move the
signal towards the neuronal cell body. This wave of dendritic signals is
accumulated as potential energy on the soma side of the axon hillock.
In my
interpretation of the theory, at the soma an inverse Fourier transform is
generated from the conversion of discrete sequences of micro-pulses into a
single semi-coherent electromagnetic field. The inverse Fourier transform is
computed as micro electromagnetic events, initiated in dendritic synapses, are
accumulated on the soma side of the axon hillock.
As the
electromagnetic imbalance is strengthened, phase coherence separates out
various parts of the spectrum, resulting in yet another localization and
discretization into a Fourier type representation. The potential energy is
drawn from the soma into a substrate composed of protein conformational
dynamics. Here chemical valances move the potential energy's location, across
the hillock where new field coherence is established.
Field coherence is
modeled as a new inverse transform. It is followed by the emergence of a forward
transform that provides the weights, or more generally the initial conditions,
to elemental pulse generators that produce electromagnetic spikes propagating
down the axon. Each forward transform selects a, perhaps quite different,
basis. Each inverse transform is involved in establishing the structural
mechanics of memory stores and in allowing these memory stores to influence the
new forward transforms as they emerge in propagated waves of neural activation.
Of course the exact
class of transforms, best suited to model neural phenomenon, is the subject of
a deeper discussion (MacLennon, 1994). The forward and inverse Fourier
transform is a first approximation.
The Fourier
transform takes an electromagnetic signal and re-expresses this signal as a sum
of amplitude and phase modulated waves expressed mathematically as regular sine
and cosine functions (of time). The sine/cosine basis is used under the
assumption that the phenomenon has strictly periodic generators. The inverse
transform takes these summed representations and loses the representation that
relies on a specific set of basis functions. Moreover, the notion of a forward
and inverse transform is an artifact of mathematical formalism, since an
electromagnetic wave can be seen in a regularized form, or not, without
effecting its ontic status.
The transform can;
however, be seen as movement between two temporally defined scales of dynamical
activity. These scales are marked by the development of regular patterns of
emergence into one scale from the other.
A neurowave propagation is then composed of a series of many (thousands)
of transform/inverse-transform pairs.
(Look ahead to Figure 6) Each
forward transform selects a representational basis, and this basis is built
depending on what is available locally to create a physical basis for the
basis. Each inverse transform encodes
information into the new “location” and allows the local ontology to re-express
the information.
For sometime, a
structural order has been observed in the organization of the cerebellum
Brodal, 1981; Ito, 1984; Gibson et al, 1985). Furthermore, experimental data,
reviewed in (Houk et al, 1990), suggests that movement signals recorded in the
magnocellular red nucleus, located outside the cerebellum, are produced by a pattern
generator located in the cerebellum. These signals are recorded by
microelectrode. The stratified theory
suggests that memory encoding and memory uptake is made via spreading
activation waves where only part of what is occurring is observed as the activation
wave. There are some deep issues here
related to how informational invariance can be preserved even if at each of a
thousand iterative cycles the basis for representing this information is
changed.
A note is in order
on the future implementation of principles being discussed here in the form of
a computer-based Human-centric Information Production (HIP) system. The voting
procedure, in Appendix A, is a simple version of quasi-axiomatic theory (see
Chapter 6). Either the voting procedure
or a more full implementation of quasi-axiomatic theory works within the
tri-level architecture. Before 2002
these implementations were not as yet a system of computer programs. After 2004, our task was to build the
conceptual foundation for stratification theory from the neuroscience and
physics. The modeling being expressed here (Figure 1) was an important first
step.
Figure 1: Modified from Houk et al 1989.
The passage
“across” the axion hillock is non-Newtonian in that several organizational
levels of stratified processes are involved.
For this reason, and for others related to the description of actual
perceptual measurement, our interpretation of the neural processes at the axion
hillock creates an illustrative model of the cross scale phenomenon, more
broadly considered.
The experimental
data suggested that electromagnetic potential energy is broken down into a set
of basic elemental processes that activate substrate "computation"
based on structure activity relationships (Prueitt, 1995, Chapter 1; Zebezhailo
et al, 1995). Following this molecular computation, the state of the substrate
developed a new representation within a derived set of basic elemental
processes. This new representation is in
the language of the metabolic environment present at the time, and location, of
the specific computation. The change in
basis is a natural consequence of the movement form one environment to another
environment.
The loci of
activity may have moved due to transport properties associated with cell
structure, again as a consequence of molecular computation. In this new
location, an emergent electromagnetic field is formed by assembling a subset of
the basic elemental processes according to situational influences at that
locus.
For the Houk/Barto
model of the cerebellum, this model works as follows: A recurrent (reentrant)
feedback pathway composes a motor program from basic elements consisting of
patterns in neuronal bursting. Composition is controlled by activated
combinatorial maps in the motor cortex. Purkinje cells { Pi }
innervate their dendrite receptive field into a regular array of parallel
fibers from cerebellum sub-cortical cells. Synaptic connections { wi,j
} encode associative strengths. Basket cells { Pi } under the
influence of the motor cortex, in the cerebral cortex, inhibit a selection of
Purkinje cells and allow the uninhibited Purkinje cells to sample the array of
parallel fibers for components of motor expressions that are consistent with
combinatorial maps that are active in the cerebral cortex. These Purkinje cells
then read out a signal, expressed via its axons, into the receptive field of a
group of subcortical cerebellar cells { N } that form a deep cerebellar
nucleus. This cerebellar nucleus has reciprocal connections and common
dendritic innervations with populations of cells, arranged in columns, located
in the cerebral motor cortex (not shown in Figure 1). The cerebellar nucleus
has excitatory connections to the red nucleus { R } which are located in the
mid brain outside the cerebellum. Environmental impulses {IMC} are
received by the red nucleus and these shape the motor commands which are then
projected to an interneuron and to muscle fiber.
The shaping of the
program's expression by a sensory stimulus is conjectured in Gibson et al,
(1985) to involve a two stage process whereby the movement signals, recorded at
the red nucleus by micro-electrode, are the expression of response patterns
composed to meet the demands of motor commands. Continuous feedback from the
environment then modifies the expression. A signal is also sent from the red
nucleus to the inferior olive (again outside the cerebellum). The inferior
olive receives reinforcement stimulation from various sources and projects
reinforcement signals to modify synaptic weights { wi,j }.
In the previous
section, a network model of one "subsystem" of the brain is
described. The purpose of this description is to advocate a specific context
for using the stratified paradigm to address a central open question regarding
the ‘discontinuity" of the stimulus pattern from one location to another.
This discontinuity was first noticed by Walter Freeman in his study of the
olfactory system of rabbits (Freeman, 1995a) and then later in other neuronal
subsystems (Freeman, 1995b). It was noticed that the stimulus patterns
generated by olfactory bulbs were lost during the transfer of the signal from
receptor cells to interneurons in route to the olfactory cortex.
Figure 2: Special episodic sequence where an organized whole
briefly dissipates into a substrate and then reorganizes
The model for cross
scale phenomenon allows us to make specific speculations. The specific discontinuity of a signal
pattern might be a generic property of a transfer function that samples a
specific part of the electromagnetic spectrum from dentro-dentritic field
interaction and encodes information from this spectrum into structural activity
relationship (SAR) information at the level of protein conformational states
(see Figure 2). This encoding might be seen as a Fourier decomposition of the
potential energy into a recipe that is then propagated via a pulse wavefront
along dendritic channels to the axon hillock. It is conceivable that at the
axon hillock the pulses, and the encoded information, is placed into some type
of micro-environment where a process of reorganization may occur.
The elements of the
sequence are initiated and terminated by cross scale events.
Using this model of
cross scale phenomenon, a viewpoint is supported that internal and persistent
cycles of emergence and dissipation is a fundamental property of open complex
systems. The viewpoint is then applied to various investigations, including the
development of computational architecture directed at managing and manipulating
machine representations (Orbs) for the purpose to assisting human production of
new real time information.
Natural language
understanding by humans depends on the emergence of mental events from which we
derive, somehow, an understanding about our environment and ourselves. The relevant science literatures suggest
that human understanding is based on the assembly of components from implicit
memories, which we represent as statistical-type artifacts, in a context that
cannot be fully captured in statistical notation. The development of the categorical abstractions that are encoded
as Orb constructions allows a simpler and more powerful means to represent the
atoms of memory and the potential relationships that might be established in a
real context.
The Orb
constructions are merely sets of ordered triples in the form < a,
r, b > where a and b
are locations within a graph and r is the relational label of the
connections between a and b (see Appendix B). The stratification theory has a very simple
computer data encoding format, and thus what the theory has in complexity the
software should have in simplicity.
Unlike Resource
Description Framework (RDF) type ontology encoding, the Orb constructions do
not make a final imposition of semantics outside of a specific situation. A
theory about situation type may be encoded in the Orb constructions, as is true
with RDF constructions. However, the
final imposition of ontological claims is withheld until a reifying process
that usually involves a human in the loop and which can take into account the
possible novelty within the specific situation. Reification implies both iterated cycles and human
introspection.
Natural scientists
have noted that the experience of context is found in action perception cycles
with an environment. Thus an increase
in the use of action-perception cycles would seem to overcome some of the limitations
imposed through the use of statistical knowledge. A dependency on “known”
substructural atoms by the ecological affordance (Gibson, 1956; Shaw, 1999)
forces regularity in substructural type and thus statistical methods do work in
creating measurement processes. These
statistical artifacts can then impose the final constraint on any emerging
pattern being expressed by the Orb elements.
Direct perceptions of both substructural type and ecological affordance
bind the formation of structure into an expression of function.
Of course, this
means that the autonomous understanding of targets of investigation, by
computational systems, should likewise depend critically on the cyclic
extraction of features from "experience". Within each cycle, new categorical invariance can be identified
and local measures of co-occurrence indicated by adjusting the set of syntactic
units in the set of Orb constructions, e.g. in the set of the form < a,
r, b >.
We argue that logio-linguistic principles can be used to encode structural
characteristics of salient features within human language, and that small
subsets of these features will evoke human mental event formation in much the
same way as in normal human communication.
In operationalizing a principled theory regarding the use of Orbs as
cognitive priming, we developed a simple form of category theory and the Orb
encoding. The resulting work produced
machine-readable ontology and first order logics that bind knowledge
representation together. This then is
the anticipatory technology.
Human perception is
the key to interpretation of anticipatory ontology. Without human in the loop activity, the machine ontology will not
reflect that part of the “now” that makes that “now” unique. The RDF standards depend on a precise
encoding of a theory of the world that is then recalled to stand in for human
knowledge. RDF is formally closed at
run time, whereas Orbs are formally open at run time.
Our
logio-linguistic principles reflect general systems properties because the underlying
morphology of concept formation has been observed by natural science to conform
to a class of general systems properties, including emergence. These properties can be seen in physical
systems, particularly if one examines certain viewpoints about quantum field
theory. As the final aspects of first
generation anticipatory technology was put into place (2002 – 2004) we
understood that Anticipatory Web concepts would eventually replace Semantic Web
concepts. The Anticipatory Web concepts
are ultimately easier to understand and have a greater fidelity to how the
brain system works. The anticipatory technology is easier to encode and
manipulate in the computer. We reasoned
that the anticipatory technology would be discovered to be cheaper, faster and
better than semantic technology.
The transformation
of information technology by Semantic Web efforts failed to achieve what was
expected. This failure was due to a mismatch
between complex natural reality and formal expressions of logic acting on
static encoding of taxonomical information.
The marginal successes occurred in cases where standard RDF ontologies
were about the data formats and data exchange issues (John Sowa, personal
conversation). Some degree of interoperability between computer programs was
achieved at a greater expense than was necessary. The confusion over the relationship between semantics and
pragmatics made real progress on differential and formative ontology very
difficult.
It was clear to
BCNGroup Founders that real-time psychological and social event structure would
be understood only if one sees events as having emergent structure. But it was also clear to us that a new
mathematics and a new computer science curriculum will soon be developed,
reflecting the principles of Human-centric Information Production (HIP) and
stratified theory. These clear
perceptions lead us in 2003 to start planning for a National Project to
establish the knowledge sciences as an academic discipline.
The limitation of
formal theory in the context of modeling complex systems was the critical
scientific result that leads to anticipatory technology.
Linguistic
principles are not described well by classical physics, nor classical logic or
set theory. The use of mathematics can
lead to a specific type of confusion.
Hilbert mathematics, for example, is often used to capture so-called “latent”
relationship due to linguistic variation seen in the distribution of words in
text. But these methods have only one
notion of nearness, the notion derived from the induction of the counting
numbers (for more on induction see; Goldfarb, 1992). Having see this issue sense the early 1990s, the BCNGroup
Founders began to make the claim that new logical principles, and notions of
membership, are required to design and implement a new generation of machine
based autonomous intelligence.
By 2004 we began to
demonstrate operational information production systems of the type we envisioned
in the mid 1990s. Three key concepts
centered around (1) organizational stratification, (2) the formation of
categories of occurrences within each level of organization and (3) cross scale
entanglements involved in emergence of events.
Events at one level were due to the aggregation of categorical defined
atoms at a faster level of organization.
A top down constraint on the emergence process is then instrumental in
placing the event within its organizational level. Computationally, the Orb sets are sampled by anticipatory
templates and a situational ontology is expressed as a phenotypic graph that
when observed primes the human cognitive process and results in a mutual-induction
involving the deductive capabilities of the computer and the inductive
capabilities of the human.
We began to use the notion of induction is a
specific way, and contrasted “induction” with “deduction”.
We
suggested that deduction is not as natural to humans as our academic
traditions indicate. Historically,
rationality and formal logics has been represented as the ideal for human
thought, not only in some theoretical sense but also in the sense that a
perfect human being has been portrayed as being perfectly rational. Rationality is defined in terms of consistency
and completeness, and is best reflected in David Hilbert’s grand vision
about the completion of mathematics.
Hilbert’s grand vision still governs a great deal of the work in science
and mathematics. However, Godel’s work
on the foundations of mathematics and related literatures demonstrate the
limitations.
Two electrical motors will induct changes in state. The coupling between physical electrical
systems is due to “holonomic” constraints related to an electromagnetic field.
Holonomic effects are not locally concentrated as described in Newtonian
action-reaction systems. The induction
occurs non-locally, and thus the mechanism “causing” the state changes is not
accounted within a discrete model.
However, the state changes do occur and can be modeled using continuum
field models. The mathematics is
elegant but is often beyond the reader’s experience. Chapter One has a longer discussion on the differences between
holonomic and non-holonomic causes.
In the same way as two physical electrical motors induce state modifications in each other via a non-local interaction; we observe that symbol systems such as natural language or gestures will cause modification in the mental state of a human being. Because of the confusion about the nature of a computer program, we use the term “mutual-induction” to talk about and action-perception cycle that involves in each cycle the two mutually exclusive systems:
1)
the computer program with some type of display or
informational interface
2)
the
acting and perceiving human living in real time and experiencing, among other
things, the information being computed by the computer.
The
human can be involved in creating computer input as a result of the responses
that the human has to old information states.
These human inputs can result in new informational states in the
computer.
Likewise,
the computer can be computing informational states in the computer. Upon viewing an informational state, the
human’s mental state is altered, or manipulated via cognitive priming, so that
human cognitive acuity and tacit knowledge is primed by the computer
informational state.
In
the anticipatory HIP architecture, the human action-perception cycle is
influenced by the series of states generated by the computer.
Figure 3: The anticipatory loop
Why is this radically different from the current uses of
a computer? Of course, humans are
always involved in these action-perception cycles. So the primary difference is in the architecture of the
computer’s data encoding and repository for production rules. The tri-level architecture matches the
biological facts, as understood by many leading cognitive scientists, and
separates the invariance of structure from the anticipation of function in
environmental context in real time.
From our study of
natural science, we know that neural systems derive implicit structure and
encode structural representation of this structure into physical substrates of
the brain (Schacter & Tulving, 1995). This means that the consequences of
experience includes modifications of metabolic processes, and these in turn may
have direct consequences at the faster time scales where metabolic and quantum
events are organized. We observe that
the properties of emergence propagate from the faster time scales into slower
time scales and are then participatory to the mental events themselves.
Through processes
of adaptation, in the many levels of self organization within the complex, the
substrate expresses coherent and emergent neural (and electro-chemical)
phenomena that have correspondence between the structural invariants of the
world experienced and internal mental event that represent this experience to
the higher order processing centers of the brain (Pribram, 1971; 1991; Levine
et al, 1993; Prueitt, 1997).
These phenomena of
emergence go to the issue of how knowledge can be extracted from a data
source. We follow a logic-linguistic
model that assumes both that knowledge acquisition and the object under
investigation is complex. Knowledge and
the natural world is complex.
In written text the
extraction of knowledge representation depends on finding correlations over
time and developing a flexible mapping between internal representations and
external objects and agents (Michalski, 1994). The computational system must
have an "understanding" of how objects are composed from a substrate
and how they function over time. This understanding can be, at least partially,
"engineered" into software and hardware. But in doing so, the engineering should have some of the same
properties of openness as do natural systems, and the overall system should
accommodate control by the environment during the periods of emergence.
The ecological
psychology community has developed a view that action-perception cycles are
emergent from the physical properties of subsystems and are driven by a class
of periodic forcing functions. The scholarly research in ecological psychology
and ecological physics views periodic forcing is an essential part of the
temporal stratification of biological organization into levels.
In this view, any
one level of organization contains objects that are emergent constructions from
a relatively stable substrate of basic elements. The periodicity of formation and collapse is simple local
attempts to balance conservation laws.
Figure 4: Natural systems stratify
It is clear from
the literature that critical issues must be resolved in any situational
analysis of natural systems.
1)
organizational
stratification,
2)
the
formation of categories of occurrences within each level of organization
and
3)
cross
scale entanglements involved in emergence of events
Categories of
occurrences and the relationships they develop define the levels as shown in
Figure 4. Each level, Li ,
has the capability of forming a substrate from which new organizational wholes
may emerge. Each of these levels, and their interaction, can be partially
simulated by a thermodynamic model. The stratification can then be nested and
thus the Figure can be misleading.
Natural systems are
"open" systems with varying kinds of openness. For example, enzymes
produce microenvironments where constraints are placed on the
"meaning" of assembled biochemical agents. In the hippocampus micro environments fuse the associational
traces of implicit memory into compartmental invariance that are
"judged" by the processes of other limbic systems and of cortical
regions. These particular microenvironments are agile semi-closed flexible and
capable of responding to novelty and nonstationarity in the environment.
Stratified theory
will allow science to organize experimental results in various areas of
investigation. These areas include work
on modeling social systems, biological systems, and environmental systems.
The stratified
thermodynamic model of open systems (Figure 5) has micro environments that
emerge through a specific coherent aggregation of compatible processes. The
average lifetime of processes at a certain level is an order of many magnitudes
different from the average lifetime of the processes at the next level. For
example, physical atoms form one level and chemicals form a different level.
Figure 5: Stratified thermodynamic model where one of the
levels has collapsed.
The collapse of one
of the microenvironments leads to the diffusion of material into an environment
that supports the reassemble of this material, and other similar material, into
new micro environments. As these new environments arise, the structure and
function reflect the characteristics of the material as well as the state of
the environment. The persistent of
function though many iteration of collapse and aggregation is maintained by
autopoiesis (Maturana and Verala 1989).
Even up to a now
(2004) it is not clear how to engineer open systems, but a great deal of the
work we have completed has not been applied to this problem. We expect to make significant progress
because the foundational principles of anticipatory technology have addressed
issues that are confused in the core concepts of semantic technology.
Open systems are
extending engineering and close loop control theory into a new class of logics
similar to quantum logic. These new
logics reflect several classes of open systems properties. The permutation of
systems into each other produces the features of assembly/disassembly processes
and thus creates the feedback loops that reify the set of Orb constructions and
the set of anticipatory templates.
The interface
between a human user and a computational system will provide a
"pragmatic" axis to situational analysis. Situational logics have formal means to describe how constituents
are assembled into operational wholes and how operational wholes are
disassembled into components. This
means that formal tools for describing assembly, degeneracy and indeterminacy
can be part of the computational logic as well as the machine - human
interface. The human cognitive ability, to step away from the formalism and
take a leap of faith, is provided a stream of high quality factual information
about event atoms and reminders of situational conditions.
Human experience of
knowledge involves an internal awareness of the structure of time, and we
humans do this well – but computational systems do not. The curriculum of the knowledge sciences
must make it clear that pragmatism is rooted in the real-time experience. This point returns us to the work by Robert
Rosen in the nature of formal systems.
Rosen’s work is indeed difficult and must be studied for some time in
order to see how his work on theoretical biology and category theory leads into
an understanding of how the experience of knowledge might be formalized. So the K-12 curricular elements must develop
a conceptual framework in which this type of difficult work can be addressed by
at least some portion of the population.
A central issue
facing general systems theory is about whether or not a class of
transformations can be characterized using methods more powerful than numerical
models. Can our present notion of computation be extended in certain useful
ways? In fact, Zabezhailo et al (1995)
demonstrated to the author that a useful predictive theory of biochemistry is
realizable. Zabezhailo used special
logics that perform "iconic computations". These computations are carried
out using the special inference operators of Quasi Axiomatic Theory (QAT)
(Finn, 1991, 1995) in the context of Soviet work on biological and chemical
warfare based on bio-chemistry.
A complete
predictive theory of biochemistry is in the future. For example, iconic structure might be inducted using a process
that is quite different from that which constructs first the integers and then
the Hilbert mathematics (see Goldfarb, 1992, work on inductive
informatics).
Paths in
"iconic" space could, of course, be analogous to trajectories in
numerical state spaces; however, these iconic trajectories should be lawfully
constrained by the information in a database containing the results of specific
analysis of biochemical structural activity relationships. Pospelov (1986;
1995) referred to these trajectories as syntagmatic chains.
Other scholars and
logicians have worked on related issues.
For example, the relationship between canalization in simplicial
complexes (Johnson, 1996) and structural adacity (Burch, 1989) in artificial
life systems provide a means for the simulation of some of the mechanisms that
are enfolding the individual state transitions of computational agents in a
complex artificial ecosystem. But it
should be noted that much of the work in artificial life treats the state
transitions as if there is an experience of state, and our position is that
there is no evidence that an experience is occurring.
The tri-level
architecture is interesting to us because the substructural level is considered
to be the atoms that when aggregated together under the influence of templates
produce the emergent phenomenon in the form of compounds. Thus we were increasingly hopeful that a new
generation of open systems engineering would be achieved with the tri-level
architecture.
One approach to
knowledge representation and management assumes the existence of a table
(database) where the system states, i.e. those states that a compartment can
assume, are all specified and related to a database of subfeatures. We
construct a system that is specified in a formal fashion and which is
computable. In this case, a theory of the world is provided in the form of
computer program.
Within the
compartmental boundary of this program, an underlying ontology can assume
different system states and thus one might capture how the meaning of terms may
drift. The rules that govern ontology allow a modification of the sense of the
terms. This gives us hope that issues of interlingua and pragmatic type can be
addressed within individual compartments.
However, the procedures for the formation and dissolution of these
programs must allow for the limitations that formal systems have in general and
that a specific program has in particular.
The system should allow for emergence and control of emergence from an
environment. How is this accomplished?
Machine
intelligence can have a layered architecture where data constructions in one
layer are combined to produce flexible concepts using partially defined
relationships. An inductive analysis of the situation is then possible, where a
fusion of data occurs based on the accommodation of characterizations of the
novelty of the situation with characterizations of the background knowledge.
Complex natural
systems are open systems that (1) are embedded in a larger space (2) are
composed through an assembly process, (3) have behavior properties with
internal and external work cycles, (4) can be described as variably stratified
(Figure 7).
Figure 7: The Target of Investigation is observed a number of
times
Because of these
four properties, the Target of Investigation can be observed a number of times
T = { O1 , O2 , . . . , On
}
·
each
"observation", O, of the target has a "bag" of properties P
= {p1 , p2 , . . . , ps}. The cardinality of
the bag of properties is finite (but open).
·
each
"observation", O, is composed from a "bag" of basic
elements A = {a1 , a2 , . . . , as}.
The cardinality of the bag of elements is finite (but open).
·
logical
hypothesis (J.S. Mill) can be asked
1.
does
an observation have (not have) property p
2.
for
each basic element, ai , is ai cause of (or not a cause
of) the property p
The observations
produce the categories of atoms and event templates. Of course, the descriptions of properties and the descriptions of
basic elements of the target of investigation must be possible.
The quality of any
automated reasoning system is a function of its power to reveal the basic
signature of a situation under investigation (see Ritz and Huber, 1996). Producing signatures requires
instrumentation, measurement, representation and encoding as well as a number
of other steps. However, a number of
different methods may produce reasonably good results, and given reasonable
good initial results it is possible to use additional methods to develop a
reification process and consequently a high quality ontology that represents
the structural characteristics of the basic signature.
The block diagram
in Figure 8 is open to architectural instantiations of computational systems
that duplicate the structural mechanisms that experimental neuropsychology
suggests are used by biological systems.
Reification processes can be developed by following this diagram
Figure 6: Block diagram for Situational Analysis
First, some sort of
instrumentation is required to have a data source. Then a data source is attended to by a system using perceptional
measurements about properties and features.
These properties and features are represented, approximated, as elements
of a set of primary components.
The separation of
properties and features is vital in establishing correlations between the
presence or absence of features and the properties of the event. The separation is thus taken to be a
stratification where features are one level of organization and properties of
the event are at a middle layer between the feature level and a level that is
defined by environmental constraints.
One can misunderstand the notion of stratification in this context. The features are properly “atoms” whose
identity has been altered by an aggregation of a set of atoms into an
object. That object haves properties,
partially determined by the atoms that compose the object.
As a practical matter
the full understanding of stratification, as exemplified in quantum mechanics
or in linguistic double articulation (Lyons, 1968), is not necessary in order
to produce value from the block diagram.
In fully stratified theory, the atoms are combined into a compound which
has properties that are partially established by environmental constraints AND
the process in which the compound comes into a separate existence as a
compound.
Stratification is essentially
already present in many machine-understanding techniques. It is seen in the separation of token
occurrence and text unit in latent semantic indexing (Dumus & Landauer,
1992). Latent semantic analysis
measures the distributed co-occurrence of elements within units. Other types of categorization and feature
extraction type techniques exist in great numbers. For example, a simple theme vector transformation of a document's
content produces a representation (Rijsbergen, 1979; Prueitt, 1996b) of the
linguistic variation in text. The
variation can also be captured using statistical models such as the hidden
Markov model. In each of these
techniques, some element of stratified theory can be seen.
Looking directly at
the variation itself can be shown using the category theory developed by
Prueitt in 2001 and 2002. This work is
called categoricalAbstraction (cA) and eventChemistry (eC). Because of the importance of the work
completed previous to 2001, this work will only be treated lightly in this
book. We anticipate a follow up book on
event chemistry. The point is that
linguistic variation itself is a phenomenon to be observed by any method that
reveals its character. Once linguistic
structure is observed and reified, then an event knowledge base can be
constructed and one can apply the tri-level architecture directly to predictive
analysis of event structure pointed at by the linguistic variation. One need not use cA and eC methods.
Theme vector
representation may also have some correspondence to how the brain processes
information. The Gabor representation
and transform may play a role in the human cortex (see Prueitt, 1997 for
literature review). The type space is
then projected into a system for visualization. In the case of human perception, this projection is a reentrant
bi-projection between the lateral geniculate nucleus and the layered visual
cortex. But we have to be careful here,
because Hilbert space type mathematics does not handle the phenomenon of
measurement and emergence as well as one might like.
One indication that
Hilbert formalism is limited is seen by observing how difficult machine
intelligence has been. Very few
software systems have visualization of theme (feature) space as well as an
integrated representation of knowledge in the form of a concept database.
Concept databases exist in a few cases (Abecker, et al, 1997), but are
primarily restricted to mechanical systems or industrial plants. Software
packages such as Spires, developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratories,
makes projections into feature spaces based on cluster analysis. But a process of reification and ontology
building has not, as yet, lead to demonstrations of event knowledge bases
having the agility and novelty detection that we predict from the Orb
systems.
Our scientific
challenge is to see both computational visualization and human perception
within the same paradigm. This may not be so difficult. A large amount of
experimental research exists and some of this has been integrated into our
explanatory framework. With stratified theory we see new computational
projection schemes based on situational semantics. The object of visualization
might be related not only to a themespace but also a concept space. And the visualization can be controlled
within the tri-level architecture so that as the visualization occurs it is
possible to allow the environment to make small perturbations in the event
representation.
The study of the
framework suggests that the human brain achieves the formation of concepts
through a distributed disassembly and reassembly of representational features
(Figure. 7). This framework is illustrative of a general systems property
regarding the emergence of operational wholes within ecosystems. It is also suggested that the human in
vitro concept space is a virtual space in the sense that the space does not
actually ever exist in total in any specific circumstance. Parts of this
virtual space come into being while other parts are blocked by various types of
competitive cooperative network dynamics. Of course, this simple architecture
disguises the complexity of how the brain uses both its neural architecture and
its chemical composition.
Figure 7: The niches in ecosystem share in the common use of a
finite class of natural type.
Machine
intelligence based on stratification might be simpler than human intelligence
and yet share behavioral features. For
example, projection from a complete enumeration of a knowledge engineering type
concept space can be made onto a concept subspace. In the block diagram this is called an interpretation space. This
subspace may be mirrored by activation of components of a situational model
supporting automated reasoning. The mirrors can be maintained by a neural
network associative memory as demonstrated in any number of neural network
architectures.
The mirrors are
two-way, and as a consequence a separate mapping back to a concept subspace is
made after an inference engine has changed the state space of the situational
model. This notion of projections and mirrors between representational spaces
is a reasonable first model for the production of computer based situational
models. Before 2002, there are a number of scientific issues that are not yet
resolved. The structural form of a
computer based concept space had not been worked out. Simple themespaces had
been defined, but a new class of objects was needed in themespaces. We expect these objects to create
topological distortions of the otherwise flat Euclidean space, and instantiate
a theory of structural operators defined in coincidence with inference engines.
The voting
procedure reflects a correspondence between human perceptional process
(involving memory, experience and anticipation) and a proposed computational
architecture for routing informational bits, knowledge artifacts, from
locations and to locations. The voting
procedure (Appendix) is the simplest form of the Russian extension of Mill’s
and Peircean logic. It has a data
structure and a process model that operationalize the correspondence between
the stratified processes involved in human memory, experience of mental
awareness, and human anticipation.
From this
correspondence, it is possible to build a model of human memory. This model is
a computational model consistent with von Neumann computing, but is organized
into three separate levels. In the model, we stipulate a set of mechanisms that
create a decomposition of experience into minimal invariance thought to be
stored in different regions of the brain (Schactner & Tulving, 1993). The
evidence for these models, of natural systems, is grounded in experimental
science, whereas the computational model is grounded in computer science. The use of the model requires a human in the
loop to reify the event structure.
The physical
process that brings the experience of the past to the present moment involves
three stages.
1) First, measured states of the world are parceled into substructural
categories.
2) An accommodation process organizes substructural categories as a
by-product of learning.
3) Finally, the substructural elements are evoked by the properties of
real time stimulus to produce an emergent composition in which the memory is
mixed with anticipation.
Each of these three
processes involves the emergence of attractor points in physically distinct
organizational strata. How does
emergence come to exist, and what material substance is combined together
during the emergence process? How does
the ecological affordance of the environment come to constrain this aggregation
process? These questions have been
treated in general within various scientific disciplines however, we treat the
issue of emergence in a semiotic fashion, with an eye on how sign systems
assist in human communication and comprehension.
Figure 7: The process flow that we take as an accurate model
of human memory formation, storage and use.
The Voting
Procedure considers questions about the "entailment" (entailment is a
generalization of all classes of causes, formal (logical), material, efficient
and final) of natural symbol systems. A symbol grounding provides a detailed
reference to distributions of potential meaning. Obtaining the specification of
these distributions is a matter of observation using an information aggregation
process. Set theory is then used to
support inference.
A class of minimal
invariants (called minimal intersections) is constructed from the
representational elements produced through measurement processes. These invariants are then used as the logical
atoms from which axiomatic situational logics are produced.
The investigation
of entailment must begin with the identification of most of the basic elements
that are involved in causing the situations under investigation. The process is
called "descriptive enumeration". Complete and consistent descriptive
enumeration requires the extraction of minimal elements to ground a system of
signs pointing to the causes of a situation.
For example, if we are considering chemical reactions and properties of
chemicals in complex situations, then these minimal elements are the signs of
either the atoms themselves or larger groups of compounds that occur as an
invariant across multiple situations.
In a similar
fashion, a situational logic can be constructed that relates the presence or
absence of these minimal elements to the properties of situations (Mill, 1843).
The situational logic is completed when plausible and reliable truth
evaluations are defined on a set of well formed formula having logic atoms
corresponding to those non-empty minimal intersections of causal elements found
through a discovery process.
So there are three
steps,
1.
the
identification of a set of minimal elements that could serve as causation of
properties, and
2.
the
development of a situational logic that predicts the properties of situations
given a partial or complete list of those minimal elements that are present in
the situation.
3.
the
maintenance of a second order system for changing the intermediate language to
accommodate new information.
The first of these
steps are addressed using a version of tri-level logical argumentation,
relating structure to function. This argumentation can be adapted to developing
the computational memory required for automated text understanding and
situational analysis. The third step requires a special interface to human
experts.