Note from Paul, October 12, 1999

Dear BCN Group colleagues,

I quote what Don wrote:

" I feel the urge to suggest another look at the "modeling relation" we often use as a model for the way we actually do science. In the modeling relation we encode some aspect of the world (natural system) into a formalism (formal system) and then decode back to see how well they match. We try to mimic some causal event in the natural system by a manipulation of our formal system, an "implication". When it all hangs together well, we have a successful model of some aspect of the world. What is important about the modeling relation is that it makes it clear that encoding and decoding are actions of our minds INDEPENDENT of either the natural or the formal system. Science has no method for these, they are creative acts, more like art. Yet science takes credit for the entire model. How is this possible? By superimposing the natural world on only ONE formalism, the Newtonian Paradigm, and thereby hiding the fact that an encoding and decoding have happened. In effect, it makes the Newtonian Paradigm the real world and all else becomes "mystical" etc. I think we need to see this clearly as we debate the narrow road vs the road less traveled. "

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Don’s position, as stated here, is how I read the scholarship of Rosen. This scholarship and the conversations I have had with Peter Kugler have grounded my view of the relationship between what is investigated and what is not investigated. As several colleagues of Howard Pattee have indicated, the central issue is the "Representation Problem" and the "Measurement Problem". This issue cannot be handled by Newtonian mechanics, because the nature of the problems involves the properties that place "natural systems" and "formal" systems into two separated categories.

Paul Werbos has made an excellent contribution to this discussion.

In Paul W.’s position, as stated there, quantum electrodynamics (QED) does not allow certain properties, such as a conjectured "remote viewing" and "backward temporal flow of information". If I have Paul W’s notion correct, then the notion states something very interesting in light of Rosen and Mikulecky (the position Don states above). The THEORY, which is QED, does not allow for certain "mystical" features. Moreover, the OBSERVATION that Paul W makes, in his note, is that biology has NOT evolved in a way that supercedes QED, as QED is now understood.

Biology has not reached "down" to pull from an underlying ontology the forces that the theory QED does not allow to exist, and which, if biology had access to said conjectured forces, would allow for "remote viewing" phenomenon.

(I hope I have this almost correct, Paul W. Please correct that which is not correct.)

Now, if one postulates the ontology of souls, and perhaps adopts a mind body theory such as that proposed by Sir John Eccles, then the soul might give access to the very type of weak atomic forces that could supplement QED conjectured force relationships, i.e. there would be good grounds to extend QED as it is now stated; or to discard QED for a new "more" unified theory. Such a new theory would provide a new class of features to an extended theory of QED plus "other".

Don’s other comment about the root of the cultural perspectives on the nature of what is mystical should give Chris and other scientist pause to reflect. Don’s additional presentation of the history of the religious aspect is also telling to the scientist. For the literature tells us that the history of Western thought has selected a narrow version of science AND has limited discourse and study to direct science to develop a position that is very much like the position of the Church. Current, often political driven, funding mechanisms work in parallel with this selection process, even though the individuals involved are often very opposed to religion. The process is a complex dialectic, with indirect effects, that gains an single objective from energy spent on both sides of an conflict, I think.

-paul